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SEARCHING FOR A “JURISDICTIONAL 
HOOK”: UNITED STATES v. KEBODEAUX AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF THE 
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 
NOTIFICATION ACT 
Casey B. Nathan* 
Abstract: On July 6, 2012, in United States v. Kebodeaux, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act’s registration requirements were unconstitutional when 
applied to the intrastate relocation of former federal convicts who had 
been unconditionally released from federal custody. This decision obfus-
cates whether former federal sex offenders must follow state or federal 
sex offender registration requirements in order to avoid criminal penal-
ties. A contrary interpretation of the Act’s statutory history that requires 
uniform registration requirements among all federal sex offenders would 
resolve this ambiguity and ensure a fair warning to all former federal of-
fenders. 
Introduction 
 In 2008, Anthony Kebodeaux was convicted by the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Texas of violating the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) by knowingly failing to up-
date his sex offender registration after moving from El Paso to San An-
tonio, Texas.1 SORNA requires all former federal sex offenders to regis-
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2013). 
1 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a), (c) (2006); United States v. Ke-
bodeaux (Kebodeaux III ), 687 F.3d 232, 233 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’g 647 F.3d 137, cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 ( Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 12–418); United States v. Kebodeaux (Kebodeaux I
), 647 F.3d 137, 138 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 687 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 928 ( Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 12–418); Judgment Against Anthony Kebodeaux, United 
States v. Kebodeaux, No. EP-08-CR-976-FM (W.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2008), ECF No. 59. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2250(a) provides: 
In general—Whoever— 
(1) is required to register under [SORNA]; 
(2)(A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes of [SORNA] by reason of 
a conviction under Federal law (including the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice) . . . ; or 
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ter their sex offender status in the district where they reside and to in-
form the local authorities in person upon any change of residence.2 Fol-
lowing his conviction, Kebodeaux was sentenced to twelve months and 
one day of imprisonment, with a five year term of supervised release.3 
 Kebodeaux appealed, arguing that Congress did not have the con-
stitutional authority to enact registration requirements that regulated 
purely intrastate movement.4 A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction.5 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the court, on its own motion, reheard the case en banc to address 
its concerns about the breadth of congressional power over previously 
released federal offenders.6 
 The en banc court considered the constitutionality of SORNA’s 
registration requirements under the Necessary and Proper Clause and 
the Commerce Clause.7 Specifically, the court considered the constitu-
tionality of SORNA’s provisions when applied to federally convicted sex 
offenders who were “unconditionally released” from federal custody 
prior to SORNA’s enactment, but who knowingly failed to update their 
residence after an intrastate residence change.8 The en banc court held 
that SORNA’s registration requirements and criminal penalties are un-
constitutional with respect to former federal sex offenders who had 
been “unconditionally released” prior to SORNA’s enactment.9 
 Unfortunately, the en banc majority’s holding obfuscates the legal 
obligations of pre-SORNA federal sex offenders.10 A contrary statutory 
interpretation requiring uniform registration requirements among all 
                                                                                                                      
(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce . . . ; and 
(3) knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by [SORNA]; 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). 
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (“A sex offender shall register, 
and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides . . . .”); 
§ 16913(c) (“A sex offender shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of . . . 
residence . . . appear in person . . . and inform that jurisdiction of all changes in the in-
formation required for that offender in the sex offender registry.”). 
3 Kebodeaux I, 647 F.3d at 139. 
4 Id. at 138. 
5 Id. at 138, 146. 
6 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 233–34, 253–54; United States v. Kebodeaux (Kebodeaux 
II ), 647 F.3d 605, 605 (5th Cir. 2011). 
7 Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 236, 244, 253. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 253. 
10 See id. at 253–54; infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
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federal sex offenders would eliminate the uncertainty of criminal sanc-
tions.11 
I. Kebodeaux’s Conviction and Appeal 
 In 1999, Anthony Kebodeaux was convicted under federal law for 
having sex with a fifteen-year-old.12 He was sentenced to and served 
three months in prison and was dishonorably discharged from the mili-
tary.13 Kebodeaux registered as a sex offender in El Paso, Texas, on Au-
gust 8, 2007.14 He then moved to San Antonio, Texas, but failed to up-
date his state registration or inform authorities of his relocation as 
required by SORNA.15 
 On March 12, 2008, the police arrested Kebodeaux in San Antonio 
for failing to update his registration.16 The following month, a federal 
grand jury indicted Kebodeaux for violating section 2250(a)(2)(A) of 
SORNA.17 Following a bench trial, Kebodeaux was convicted and sen-
tenced to twelve months and one day of imprisonment, with a five year 
term of supervised release.18 
 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Kebodeaux argued that Congress 
can only regulate interstate commerce.19 Thus, according to Ke-
bodeaux, Congress could not enact section 2250(a)(2)(A) of SORNA 
because that provision only regulates intrastate activities.20 In addition, 
Kebodeaux argued that no other source of Article I authority empow-
                                                                                                                      
11 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 265–69 (Haynes, J., dissenting); infra notes 87–89 and 
accompanying text. 
12 United States v. Kebodeaux (Kebodeaux III ), 687 F.3d 232, 233–34 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc), rev’g 647 F.3d 137, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 ( Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 12–418); 
United States v. Kebodeaux (Kebodeaux I ), 647 F.3d 137, 138 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 
687 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 ( Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 12–418); see 
also 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1994) (prohibiting “carnal knowledge” with a child under sixteen 
years old). 
13 Kebodeaux I, 647 F.3d at 138. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a), (c) (2006) (requiring convicted sex offenders to 
keep their registration current and appear in person to update their registration no later 
than three business days after a change of residence). 
16 Kebodeaux I, 647 F.3d at 138. 
17 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006); Kebodeaux I, 647 F.3d at 138. 
18 Kebodeaux I, 647 F.3d at 139. Kebodeaux qualified as a federal sex offender under 
SORNA because of his previous conviction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See 
§ 2250 (defining a person as a sex offender for the purposes of SORNA “by reason of a 
conviction under Federal law (including the Uniform Code of Military Justice)”) (emphasis 
added); Kebodeaux I, 647 F.3d at 139. 
19 Kebodeaux I, 647 F.3d at 138. 
20 Id. 
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ered Congress to impose SORNA’s registration requirements.21 The 
panel affirmed Kebodeaux’s conviction concluding that Congress had 
the power to enact SORNA under the Necessary and Proper Clause.22 
 On its own motion, the Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc to 
address its concerns that SORNA potentially allowed Congress to assert 
unending criminal authority over previously released federal offend-
ers.23 The court dismissed Kebodeaux’s case on narrow grounds find-
ing his conviction unconstitutional.24 The Fifth Circuit held that absent 
some “jurisdictional hook” such as interstate travel, Congress has no 
Article I power to enact registration requirements with criminal penal-
ties over a former sex offender who had been “unconditionally re-
leased” from prison.25 
II. The Jurisdictional Hook: A Constitutional  
or Statutory Question 
 The en banc court only addressed whether Congress could impose 
registration requirements on federal convicts who had been “uncondi-
tionally released” from federal custody.26 The court acknowledged that 
Congress has the power to impose SORNA’s registration requirements 
on federal offenders who are currently in federal supervision regardless 
of whether they travel inter or intrastate.27 The en banc majority thus 
confronted two separate issues regarding federal offenders who have 
been “unconditionally released” from federal custody: (1) whether the 
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to apply 
SORNA’s registration requirements; and (2) whether Congress may 
                                                                                                                      
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 138, 142–46. In his panel concurrence, Judge Dennis reasoned that Congress 
has authority under the Commerce Clause to enact section 2250(a)(2)(A) to make the 
remainder of SORNA an effective regulation of interstate commerce. See id. at 146 (Den-
nis, J., concurring) (“This court and others have consistently held that § 2250(a)(2)(B) is a 
constitutional execution of Congress’s power to regulate the channels of, and persons in, 
interstate commerce.”). 
23 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 233–34; United States v. Kebodeaux (Kebodeaux II ), 647 
F.3d 605, 605 (5th Cir. 2011). 
24 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 234–35, 253–54. 
25 Id. at 234–35. 
26 United States v. Kebodeaux (Kebodeaux III ), 687 F.3d 232, 234–35 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc), rev’g 647 F.3d 137, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 ( Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 12–418). 
27 See id. at 234, 253. The majority found that an offender is in federal custody if he or 
she is in federal prison or on supervised release. See id. at 234–35. Additionally, the major-
ity found SORNA’s intrastate registration requirements apply to any federal offender con-
victed after the passage of SORNA. Id. at 235. 
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impose SORNA’s registration requirements under its Commerce Clause 
power.28 
 The majority held that neither the Necessary and Proper Clause 
nor the Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to enact such 
requirements.29 In her dissent, however, Judge Haynes disputed that 
Kebodeaux was “unconditionally released.”30 Therefore, Judge Haynes 
saw no need to engage in a constitutional analysis to locate a “jurisdic-
tional hook” necessary to impose SORNA’s registration requirements 
on Kebodeaux.31 
A. No Jurisdictional Hook Under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
 In determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress the ability to impose registration requirements for offenders 
unconditionally released by the government, the en banc court relied 
on the framework articulated in 2010 by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Comstock.32 In Comstock, the Supreme Court examined whether 
the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the authority to enact 
“[a] federal civil commitment statute [that] authorizes the Department 
of Justice to detain mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoners 
beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released.”33 The 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the civil commitment statute after 
examining five considerations: (1) the breadth of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause; (2) the history of federal involvement in that statute’s 
arena; (3) the reasons for the statute’s enactment; (4) the statute’s ac-
commodation of state interests; and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.34 
 In applying these factors to Kebodeaux’s case, the en banc major-
ity acknowledged that the first Comstock consideration affords a “pre-
sumption of constitutionality” to an enacted statute when the statute is 
“rationally related” to the broad authority that Congress has to enact 
legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause.35 The majority 
                                                                                                                      
28 Id. at 236, 244–45. 
29 See id. at 253–54. 
30 See id. at 267–68 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
31 See id. at 265, 268. 
32 Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 236, 245 (citing United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 
1954 (2010)). 
33 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1954, 1956. 
34 See id. at 1956, 1965. 
35 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 236–37 (citing Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957). “[I]n de-
termining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative au-
thority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a 
means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated 
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found, however, that the remaining four considerations, taken together, 
can outweigh the presumption of constitutionality of a statute.36 Ac-
cordingly, the majority weighed the remaining four Comstock considera-
tions individually to determine SORNA’s constitutionality.37 
 Pursuant to the second Comstock consideration, the court exam-
ined whether SORNA was a modest addition to federal laws that have 
existed for decades.38 The majority noted that federal sex registration 
laws have a short statutory history.39 In addition, the majority found 
that no other federal laws have ever asserted jurisdiction over someone 
after they had been released from federal custody just because that per-
son committed a federal crime.40 As a result, the majority held that 
SORNA’s registration requirements were “constitutionally novel” rather 
than modest additions to existing federal laws and weighed the second 
factor in Kebodeaux’s favor.41 
 Under the third Comstock consideration, the court examined 
whether SORNA was a reasonable extension of Congress’s well-
established laws.42 The court recognized that similar federal powers like 
supervised release and probation are reasonable extensions of federal 
power because they are used as a means to prevent public danger or to 
punish offenders.43 The court, however, distinguished supervised re-
lease and probation that apply to federal offenders either upon convic-
tion or while they are in federal custody, from SORNA’s registration 
requirements that apply to “unconditionally released” former federal 
offenders.44 Accordingly, the court found that SORNA’s registration 
requirements, as applied to “unconditionally released” former federal 
offenders like Kebodeaux, are not a means to punish a sex offender or 
prevent public danger from a sex offender’s release.45 
                                                                                                                      
power.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Constitution “‘leaves 
to Congress a large discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given 
power.’” Id. at 1957 (emphasis added) (quoting Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 
321, 355 (1903)); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (applying a 
presumption of constitutionality when examining congressional enactments out of “due 
respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch”). 
36 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 236–37. 
37 See id. at 237–45. 
38 See id. at 237–38 (citing Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958). 
39 See id. at 238. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 237–38. 
42 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 238–39, 239 n.18 (citing Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1961). 
43 See id. at 238–40. 
44 See id. at 239–40. 
45 See id. 
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 Moreover, the majority reasoned that SORNA’s registration re-
quirements are an attempt by Congress to obtain an “eternal supervi-
sory interest” over anyone who ever committed a sex crime.46 There-
fore, because holding SORNA constitutional could give Congress 
unlimited power to regulate anyone ever convicted of a federal crime, 
the majority held that SORNA’s registration requirements were not a 
reasonable extension of Congress’s well-established laws.47 
 Examining the fourth Comstock consideration, the court assessed 
whether SORNA properly accounted for state interests.48 The majority 
found that SORNA contained no provisions where a sex offender could 
be transferred to state custody.49 In addition, a state could not control 
the punishment of federal sex offenders who did not update their reg-
istration within that state’s borders.50 Therefore, the majority held that 
the fourth consideration weighed in Kebodeaux’s favor because 
SORNA did not account for state interests.51 
 Finally, under the fifth Comstock consideration, the court examined 
whether SORNA was too sweeping in its scope.52 Here, the majority 
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. at 241–42. The panel majority held that SORNA was a reasonable adaption of 
federal law because the federal government has “a direct supervisory interest over former 
federal prisoners.” See United States v. Kebodeaux (Kebodeaux I ), 647 F.3d 137, 143–44 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (citing Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2239 (2010)), rev’d en banc, 687 
F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 ( Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 12–418). The en 
banc majority rejected this reasoning because Kebodeaux was long free of federal custody 
and supervision. See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 242 (“To say that Congress continues to have 
a ‘direct supervisory interest’ over such persons—like Kebodeaux—is to announce that it 
has an eternal supervisory interest over anyone who ever committed a federal sex crime.”). 
47 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 242–43 (finding that “because there is nothing that is 
constitutionally special about sex crimes,” granting the federal government an “eternal 
supervisory interest” over sex offenders is no different than saying that “Congress has such 
an interest over anyone who ever committed any federal crime”). 
48 See id. at 243 (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965). Because states have the primary 
authority to define and enforce criminal laws, federal criminalization of conduct has the 
effect of changing the “sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdictions” 
or, alternatively, “displac[ing] state policy choices” when that state has chosen not to out-
law the conduct. See id. (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411–12 (1973) 
(requiring that statutory language or an Act’s legislative history must be explicit to justify 
the federal policing of the conduct of strikes)); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 
349 (1971) (“Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal crime con-
duct readily denounced as criminal by the States . . . we will not be quick to assume that 
Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal 
and state criminal jurisdiction.”). 
49 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 243 (citing Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962–63) (noting that 
in Comstock, states were given the option to assert authority over federal offenders). 
50 See id. at 243–44. 
51 See id. 
52 Id. at 244 (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963). 
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found that SORNA’s provisions were overbroad because they gave Con-
gress power over anyone who was ever convicted of a sex offense.53 As a 
result, the en banc majority held that, taken together, the final four 
Comstock considerations—which all weighed in Kebodeaux’s favor—
outweighed the presumption of the constitutionality of SORNA under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.54 
B. No Jurisdictional Hook Under the Commerce Clause 
 As an alternative argument for upholding SORNA, the govern-
ment posited that SORNA’s registration requirements are constitu-
tional under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.55 The en banc court 
analyzed this argument using the framework established by the Su-
preme Court in 1995 in United States v. Lopez.56 According to Lopez, 
Congress may use its Commerce Clause authority to: (1) “regulate the 
use of the channels of interstate commerce;” (2) “regulate and protect 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from in-
trastate activities;” and (3) “regulate those activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.”57 
 The government argued that Kebodeaux’s case fit into the first two 
categories of Commerce Clause authority.58 When a sex offender travels 
across state lines, a state’s jurisdiction ends, leaving the task of tracking 
and arresting an unmonitored sex offender to the federal govern-
ment.59 Accordingly, the government contended that SORNA protects 
“the channels of” and “persons or things in” interstate commerce be-
                                                                                                                      
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 236, 245. 
55 Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 245. 
56 Id. at 245 & n.38 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59, 567 (1995)). 
United States v. Lopez addressed the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 that “made it a fed-
eral offense ‘for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual 
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.’” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (quot-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988), invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560). The Supreme 
Court found the Act unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’s authority over inter-
state commerce. Id. 
57 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59; see also Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 245 n.38 (describing Lo-
pez as “holding that because the Gun-Free School Zones Act does not fall within any of the 
three categories, it is an unconstitutional exercise of federal power”). 
58 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 245. 
59 See id. at 250. 
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cause “it reduces the risk of unmonitored interstate travel by sex of-
fenders.”60 
 The en banc majority, however, found that SORNA’s regulations 
did not fit into any of the three Lopez categories.61 Moreover, the court 
held that the government’s argument would significantly expand Con-
gress’s power under the first two categories of the Commerce Clause.62 
Instead of regulating “the use of” or “persons or things in” interstate 
commerce, Congress would be able to regulate “the possible use of the 
channels” and “persons or things because they will potentially be in” inter-
state commerce.63 As a result, the majority held that SORNA’s regula-
tions cannot be justified under a federal commerce power that would 
“confer on the federal government plenary power to regulate all crimi-
nal activity.”64 
C. In Dissent: A Jurisdictional Hook Arises from Statutory History 
 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Haynes rejected the en banc ma-
jority’s contention that the federal government lacks jurisdiction to im-
pose sex offender registration requirements on Kebodeaux.65 She rea-
soned that because Kebodeaux was never “unconditionally released,” 
he was still under federal supervision at the time of SORNA’s passage in 
2006.66 Considering the en banc majority conceded that Congress may 
place SORNA’s registration requirements on anyone under federal su-
pervision, Judge Haynes posited that the majority’s constitutional 
analysis of SORNA was unnecessary.67 
 To determine that Kebodeaux was under federal supervision at the 
time of SORNA’s passage, Judge Haynes examined the statutory history 
of federal sex offender registration laws before Kebodeaux was con-
victed of statutory rape and up to the passage of SORNA in 2006.68 In 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. at 245; see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. 
61 Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 246–53. Because SORNA regulates all intrastate and inter-
state movement by federal sex offenders, it does not regulate “only activity ‘directed’ at the 
channels of interstate commerce.” Id. at 247 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617). Moreover, 
“SORNA’s sex-offender registration requirements do not regulate persons in interstate 
commerce because sex offenders do not engage in activity that is either ‘interstate’ or 
‘commerce’ just by virtue of being sex offenders.” Id. at 250. 
62 See id. at 245–46. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at 245–46, 253. 
65 See id. at 268 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
66 See id. at 256–63 (Dennis, J., dissenting); id. at 263–69 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
67 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 265 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
68 See id. at 265–67. 
62 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33: E. Supp. 
1994, Congress enacted the Wetterling Act, which subjected certain sex 
offenders to a minimum of ten years of registration requirements 
through a state based registration system.69 Two years later, Congress 
enacted the Pam Lychner Act, which retained the Wetterling Act’s ten-
year minimum for sex offenders and imposed lifetime registration re-
quirements on other offenders.70 The Lychner Act included a criminal 
penalty for certain offenders’ failure to register, and additionally, cre-
ated a national database to enable registrant tracking by the FBI and to 
provide a means to register offenders living in states not in compliance 
with the Wetterling Act.71 In 1997, the Jacob Wetterling Improvements 
Act extended these registration requirements to other offenders, in-
cluding Kebodeaux when he was convicted under Article 120 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.72 
 In 2006, in an effort to make the federal sex offender registration 
system more uniform and effective, Congress repealed and “folded” the 
Wetterling and Lychner Acts into SORNA.73 By tracing the statutory 
history, Judge Haynes argued that at the time of Kebodeaux’s release in 
1999, he was required to register for at least ten years regardless of the 
state in which he chose to reside.74 If the state complied with the Wet-
terling and Lychner Acts, it would receive federal funding and Ke-
bodeaux would be required to register with that state.75 If a state was 
not compliant, Kebodeaux would be required to register with the FBI.76 
Therefore, because the Wetterling and Lychner Acts were incorporated 
into SORNA in 2006, Judge Haynes reasoned that the federal govern-
ment “never gave up its ‘federal’ interest in Kebodeaux as a convicted 
                                                                                                                      
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (Supp. IV 1999), repealed by SORNA, § 129(a), Pub. L. 109–248, 
Title I, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 600 (2006); Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 265 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 14072, repealed by SORNA, § 129(a), Pub. L. 109–248, Title I, § 129(a), 
120 Stat. 600 (2006); Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 265 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
71 See § 14072; Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 266 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
72 See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c)(4)(E) (1997), repealed by SORNA, Pub. L. 109–248, Title I, 
§ 141(h), 120 Stat. 604 (2006) (including persons convicted of an “offense designated by 
the Attorney General as a sexual offense for purposes of this subsection”); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14072(i) (requiring registration by any person “described in section 4042(c) of title 18”); 
28 C.F.R. § 571.72 (1999), invalidated by Simmons v. Nash, 361 F. Supp. 2d 452, 457 (D.N.J. 
2005) (designating offense 120B1/2 (Carnal Knowledge) of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice as a sexual offense for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c)); Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 
266 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
73 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 267 (Haynes, J., dissenting) (citing Reynolds v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 978 (2012) (finding that Congress repealed several earlier federal 
laws and passed SORNA to make sex offender registration more “uniform and effective”)). 
74 See id. at 266–67. 
75 See id. at 266. 
76 See id. at 267. 
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federal sex offender.”77 In other words, Judge Haynes maintained, in 
opposition to the majority’s underlying premise, that Kebodeaux was 
never “unconditionally released” and therefore the federal government 
never lost its “jurisdictional hook.”78 
III. Finding Certainty: Rethinking the Majority’s  
Statutory Assumption 
 In consideration of the legislative history, Judge Haynes logically 
reasoned in her dissenting opinion that the federal government did 
not “unconditionally release” Kebodeaux and other similar pre-SORNA 
sex offenders.79 The en banc majority responded to Judge Haynes’s 
contention that Kebodeaux was not unconditionally released by dubi-
ously noting that pre-SORNA sex offender laws merely conditioned 
federal funding on states to maintain their own registries.80 By relying 
on this statutory interpretation, only sex offenders residing in non-
compliant states were subject to federal guidelines.81 
 A plain reading of the Lychner Act, however, shows that the statute 
enforces federal criminal penalties upon any former federal sex of-
fender who fails to register regardless of whether the state where the 
offender resides is compliant with the Act.82 Thus, Kebodeaux’s release 
from prison and the military, and up to the passage of SORNA, was 
conditioned on registration of his change of address for ten years; if he 
did not register, he would be subject to federal criminal penalties.83 As a 
result, the majority did not need to address the constitutionality ques-
tion.84 
                                                                                                                      
77 See id. at 267–68. 
78 See id. 
79 See United States v. Kebodeaux (Kebodeaux III ), 687 F.3d 232, 268 (5th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (Haynes, J., dissenting), rev’g 647 F.3d 137, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 ( Jan. 11, 2013) 
(No. 12–418). 
80 See id. at 235 n.4 (majority opinion). 
81 See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14072(g)(1)(3), (i) (Supp. IV 1999), repealed by SORNA, 
§ 129(a), Pub. L. 109–248, Title I, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 600 (2006)). 
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 14072(i). 42 U.S.C. § 14072(i) provides: 
A person who is . . . (3) described in section 4042(c)(4) of title 18, and know-
ingly fails to register in any State in which the person resides . . . shall, in the 
case of a first offense under this subsection, be imprisoned for not more than 
1 year and, in the case of a second or subsequent offense under this subsec-
tion, be imprisoned for not more than 10 years. 
Id. 
83 See id.; Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 266–67 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
84 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d 265 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
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 Furthermore, a consequence flowing from the en banc majority’s 
interpretation of SORNA is that some former federal sex offenders are 
subjected to federal law, and others to only state law; pre-SORNA sex 
offenders who lived in states not in compliance with the Wetterling or 
Lychner Acts at the time they committed a sex offense could always be 
subject to federal guidelines.85 Increased complexity of sex offender 
registration laws, unfortunately, renders it likely that pre-SORNA of-
fenders who attempt to abide by the law may incorrectly conclude 
which registration requirements apply to them, exposing them to un-
necessary punishment.86 
 In contrast, Judge Haynes’s reading of SORNA eliminates any un-
certainty about the registration requirements of pre-SORNA federal sex 
offenders.87 All post-Wetterling federal sex offenders would be required 
to follow SORNA’s registration requirements upon any change of ad-
dress.88 Because failure to follow sex offender registration laws can lead 
to loss of liberty through incarceration, eliminating any uncertainties in 
its enforcement is crucial to ensure a fair warning to potential offend-
ers and thereby protect the civil liberties of former federal convicts.89 
Conclusion 
 Concerned about the breadth of the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act and the scope of congressional authority, the Fifth 
Circuit, sitting en banc, reheard United States v. Kebodeaux on its own 
motion. The court considered the statute’s constitutionality under the 
                                                                                                                      
85 See id. at 235 n.4 (majority opinion) (“Because his state of residence, Texas, was 
compliant with federal guidelines at the time of his offense, Kebodeaux was not subject to 
federal registration requirements.”) (emphasis added). Contrapositively, this means that a 
federal offender who lived in a state that was not compliant with the Wetterling Act at the 
time of his conviction or while he was in custody was subject to federal, not state, registra-
tion requirements upon his release. Cf. id. at 265 (Haynes, J., dissenting) (“The majority 
concedes that Congress may place conditions on a federal prisoner’s release from custody, 
or even impose sex-offender registration requirements on anyone under federal supervision 
. . . .”) (emphasis added). Therefore, that offender could be subject to federal registration 
requirements because the government did not cede jurisdiction. See id. 
86 See Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 982 (2012) (observing that the com-
plexities in SORNA created gaps about how the registration requirements are applied that 
could confuse pre-SORNA sex offenders). 
87 See Kebodeaux III, 687 F.3d at 268 (Haynes, J., dissenting). 
88 See id. at 267–68 (“I see no reason to distinguish the jurisdiction (as a matter of fed-
eral power) exercised over Kebodeaux under SORNA from that exercised under its prede-
cessor sex offender registry laws that applied to Kebodeaux.”) 
89 See Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 982 (finding that eliminating uncertainties to pre-SORNA 
offenders about how the registration requirements apply to them helps to “eliminate the 
very kind of vagueness and uncertainty that criminal law must seek to avoid”). 
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Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce Clause. The majority 
held that sex offenders convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment and un-
conditionally released by the government should not be subject to 
SORNA’s registration requirements after intrastate relocation. Never-
theless, the majority should have adopted Judge Haynes’s reading of 
the statutory history of federal sex offender laws. In her dissenting 
opinion, Judge Haynes questioned the premise that the federal gov-
ernment unconditionally released Kebodeaux and therefore argued 
that the majority did not need to reach its constitutional analysis. The 
result of the majority’s analysis will likely leave former federal sex of-
fenders with uncertainty as to which registration laws apply to them. By 
obfuscating a sex offender’s legal obligations, the Fifth Circuit’s hold-
ing increases the chance that former offenders will inadvertently break 
the law by failing to register correctly and, in so doing, subjects those 
offenders to an otherwise avoidable loss of liberty. 
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